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penalty. On remand, Krilich filed a Rule 60(b) (4) motion to vacate
the judgment as void because the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over EPA's complaint. The district court denied the
motion and Krilich appealed.
On appeal, Krilich argued that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction because the wetland he allegedly filled was an
"isolated intrastate wetland" and was not part of the "waters of the
United States" within the meaning of the CWA. Krilich argued that
the "isolated intrastate wetland" was beyond the federal government's
commerce power to regulate, and therefore the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over EPA's complaint. In addition, Krilich
contended the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction despite
the fact he had agreed in the consent decree that the wetland he filled
was part of the "waters of the United States."
The court held that the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction over EPA's case against Krilich because EPA civilly charged
him with violating a federal statute, which was within the federal
courts' federal question jurisdiction. In reaching its holding, the court
stated Krilich confused the meaning of the term 'jurisdiction." The
court stated the interstate commerce power to regulate "waters of the
United States" did not affect the subject matter jurisdiction of the
district court to hear the case. Rather, the issue of whether the
wetland Krilich filled was within Congress's interstate commerce power
to regulate was an element of the offense itself. Krilich's violation of
the CWA triggered the district court's jurisdiction. Therefore, the
court affirmed the district court's denial of Krilich's 60(b) (4) motion
to bar enforcement of the penalty.
JulieE. Hultgren

EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Sokol v. Kennedy, 210 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding the National
Park Service's identification and application of the "significant and
important" values criteria rather than the "outstandingly remarkable"
values criteria to determine and set boundaries for protected river area
violated the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, and that the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act does not require physical demarcation of protected river
boundaries).
The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act ("Act") protects portions of certain
rivers determined to possess, along with their immediate surrounding
environments, "outstandingly remarkable" values. Pursuant to a 1991
amendment to the Act, Congress directed the Secretary of the Interior
to select boundaries along Nebraska's Niobrara River ("River") for
protection under the terms of the Act. The Secretary of the Interior
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subsequently delegated the responsibility of selecting such boundaries
to the National Park Service ("NPS").
NPS began a four-year boundary determination process in 1992.
NPS formed a planning team to research and analyze River
information gathered from private and public resources, personal
observations, and field studies. NPS used this information to create
"resource maps" and develop boundary alternatives. Additionally, NPS
formed an Advisory Commission consisting of local residents,
environmental experts, business persons, and state officials, to
participate in the review process and to receive and consider public
comment and concern regarding boundary selection.
In considering areas for inclusion within the protected boundaries,
the planning team analyzed the River in terms of its "significant and
The planning team claimed it utilized the
important" values.
"significant and important" criteria rather than the "outstandingly
remarkable" criteria set forth in the Act because the team was more
familiar with the breadth of the former criteria due to its use in other
The planning team argued that the
regulatory schemes.
"outstandingly remarkable" criteria was relevant only to the selection
of new rivers requiring protection under the Act and was not relevant
to the establishment of boundaries for selected rivers. When NPS
received a complaint from David Sokol ("Sokol"), plaintiff and
landowner, that NPS's use of the "significant and important" criteria
violated the language of the Act, NPS purported to utilize the
"outstandingly remarkable" criteria. NPS stated this criteria was
synonymous with the "significant and important" criteria. NPS revised
its draft and final boundary alternatives and its final Record of
Decision to reflect its use of the "outstandingly remarkable" criteria in
boundary determinations.
Sokol filed suit in the United States District Court for the District
of Nebraska claiming NPS violated the Act. He claimed NPS failed to
utilize the required "outstandingly remarkable" standard and failed to
physically mark the finally determined River area boundaries. NPS
responded that it had complete discretion to determine the final River
area boundaries to protect and that the Act failed to provide an
absolute standard for setting boundaries. NPS further responded that
the "outstandingly remarkable" criteria did not apply and, even if such
criteria did apply, the "significant and important" criteria utilized by
the planning team was synonymous with such criteria. Finally, NPS
argued the Act did not require physical demarcation of river
boundaries. The district court granted NPS's motion for summary
judgment.
Applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of the
Administrative Procedure Act to NPS's action, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the district
court's decision. The court noted the Act provides that each river
protected under the Act must be administered to protect and enhance
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the values, which caused the initial protection of the river.
Additionally, the court stated that the "outstandingly remarkable"
values of a river and its surroundings require consideration to
determine whether to protect a river under the Act.
First, the court acknowledged the Act gives NPS broad discretion
in determining which areas to include as protected areas, but rejected
NPS's argument that the Act failed to provide an absolute standard for
setting boundaries of protected River areas. The court held that the
Act mandated the use of the "outstandingly remarkable" criteria in
determining the River area boundaries.
Second, the court rejected NPS's argument that it did utilize the
"outstandingly remarkable" standard because it considered such
standard synonymous with the "significant and important" criteria.
The court determined the terms "significant and important" were
much broader and included more qualities than the terms
"outstandingly remarkable."NPS argued that any reference to the
"significant and important" standard was corrected in the final
boundary decision and corresponding report. The court rejected the
re-definitions as insufficient because NPS's entire analysis and decision
still rested upon the "significant and important" standard, not the
"outstandingly remarkable" standard required by the Act.
Finally, the court affirmed that NPS was not required to physically
mark the final boundaries of the protected River area. It noted that
the Act simply requires NPS to make available to the public
information regarding such boundaries on maps located in the offices
of the administering agency.
The court reversed and remanded the case with instructions. The
trial court must remand to NPS and NPS must determine River area
boundaries utilizing the "outstandingly remarkable" values standard.
Megan Becher-Harris
NINTH CIRCUIT
Carson Harbor Viii., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 227 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act: (1) necessary response costs
are found in the nature of the threat presented by the contamination
and whether the response action addressed the threat, lack of agency
action is not dispositive of whether contamination presents
environmental risk worthy of response, and evidence of ulterior motive
is insignificant; (2) the statutory term "disposal" includes passive
migration of hazardous materials; and (3) the strict liability statute
does not require a causal nexus correlating the costs incurred and an
individual generator's waste).

